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1 What is the topic of the paper?
• Account for upward monotonicity in opaque verbs.
(1) Jones is looking for a green sweater ∴ Jones is looking for a sweater
(2) Jones is looking for a sweater ∴ Jones is looking for something
• Account for relative clauses:
(3) Jones is looking for something Smith is looking for.




(4) Jones is looking for a sweater: ∃P [P ⊑ λxS(x) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
Namely: there is a property, the property of being a sweater of some kind, such that Jones seeks it.
P ⊑ λxS(x) =df (∃Q)[P = λx(S(x) ∧Q(x)] : the property of being a sweater of some kind
“Look for” = “seek”: type (et)(et) : expressing a relation between individuals and properties
“sweater”:
{
λxS(x) : type (et)
λP.P ⊑ λxS(x) : type (et)t
“a”: λPλQ(∃P )[P(P ) ∧Q(P )]
“a sweater”: λQ(∃P )[P ⊑ λxS(x) ∧Q(P )]
(5) Jones is looking for a green sweater: ∃P [P ⊑ λx(G(x) ∧ S(x)) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
The inference from (2) to (4) is explained, since : λx(G(x) ∧ S(x)) ⊑ λxS(x)
(6) Jones is looking for something: ∃P (SEEK(j, P ))
1
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b) Relative clauses
(7) Jones is looking for something Smith is looking for: ∃P (SEEK(s, P ) ∧ SEEK(j, P ))
c) Specific and non-specific readings
(8) There is a particular sweater that Jones seeks: ∃y[S(y) ∧ SEEK(j, λz(y = z))]
Jones seeks a sweater (but no particular one): ∃P [P ⊑ λxS(x) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
3 Monotonicity
• A nice feature of Zimmermann’s account is the syntactic parallel drawn between ETVs (type e(et))
and ITVs (type (et)(et)). In each case:
(i) the NP complement is interpreted as taking wide scope over the transitive verb, the difference being
in the type of object that is selected.
(9) (a) Jones is wearing a sweater: ∃y[S(y) ∧WEAR(j, y)] (ETV)
(b) Jones seeks a sweater: ∃P [P ⊑ λxS(x) ∧ SEEK(j, P )] (ITV, non-specific)
(c) ∃y[S(y) ∧ SEEK(j, λz(y = z))] (ITV, specific)
(ii) Monotonicity in ITVs is explained along the same lines as monotonicity in ETVs, namely as
resting on existential weakening. This seems nice, as monotonicity in ETVS seems to originate from
the properties of the indefinite as an existential NP. More generally, monotonicity in TVs (intensional
or extensional) seems to depend solely on the properties of the NP that is in object position of the
verb, and not on the lexical semantics of the TV.
(10) (a) Jones is wearing a green sweater : ∃y(S(y) ∧G(y) ∧WEAR(j, y))
(b) Jones seeks a green sweater: ∃P [P ⊑ λx(G(x) ∧ S(x)) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
(c) ∃y[S(y) ∧G(y) ∧ SEEK(j, λz(y = z))]
• We can note incidentally that the analysis of monotonicity as an instance of existential weakening
has to rest on the less-general-than (⊑) relation instead of just the equality relation (=):
(11) Jones seeks a sweater: ∃P [P = λxS(x) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
This analysis would not by itself allow ↑-monotonicity, and I understand it would moreover fall prey
to the Common Goals Problem (“Monotonicity Problem”). In particular, it would validate (12) (re-
placing ⊑ by =), which is not validated in Zimmermann’s analysis:
(12) Jones is looking for a sweater: ∃P [P ⊑ λxS(x) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
Smith is looking for a sweater: ∃P [P ⊑ λxS(x)) ∧ SEEK(s, P )]
Jones is looking for something Smith is looking for: ∃P [SEEK(s, P ) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
A clarification question concerns the following aspect of the solution to the Common Goal problem,
however:
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- (12) is not valid on a specific reading of “a sweater”, as predicted [scenario 1: Jones is looking
for the particular green sweater he was wearing yesterday, Smith is looking for the particular blue
sweater he was wearing yesterday.]1
- It is not valid either on Zimmermann’s analysis of non-specific readings, where “sweater” is
taken to mean “sweater of some kind” (my paraphrase of λP.P ⊑ λxS(x)) [scenario 2: Jones is
looking for some green sweater or other, Smith for some blue sweater or other].
- However, what about the non-specific reading of the premises suggesting that each of Jones
and Smith would be happy to find any sweater whatsoever : it seems to support “Jones is looking
for the same thing as Smith” ie “Jones is looking for the same thing Smith is looking for” (namely
“a sweater”). What is the account for this reading? The equality analysis (11) would validate the
inference, but without explaining monotonicity inferences. The less-general-than analysis explains
why monotonicity inferences go through, but conversely it does not seem to account for the reading
on which the inference in (12) is valid.
4 Specificity
• The Disjunction Problem (Forbes 2005)
(13) Jones seeks a sweater: ∃P [P ⊑ λxS(x) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
Jones seeks a sweater or a balloon: ∃P [P ⊑ λx(S(x) ∨B(x)) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
The inference in NL does not seem to be valid under the non-specific reading characteristic of
ITVs, for “seeking a sweater or a balloon” suggests that finding a balloon and not a sweater would
successfully end the search. However, the semantics validates it.
Conjunctive force: the disjunction seems to entail “Jones seeks a sweater and Jones seeks a bal-
loon” (but not necessarily “Jones seeks a sweater and a balloon”, which under one interpretation
would entail that the search can end successfully iff he finds both).
Zimmermann thinks the problem can be solved by assigning “or” a non-Boolean semantics. I tend
to agree with Forbes that an account based on a classical semantics would be more appropriate. Would
it be possible to accommodate an account along the lines of Forbes within Zimmermann’s approach?
(ie an account where the conjunctive force of disjunction is explained as its occurrence within the
antecedent of a universal quantifier).
The problem certainly relates to free choice disjunction phenomena: conjunctive force seems to
appear only with a subclass of the ITVs (seek, want, need, etc), going with specific success conditions,
and moreover for those verbs which licence supplementary any (not all of them do, e.g. imagine, see
Dayal 2005):
(14) Jones needs a book, any book
*Jones has found a book, any book
*Jones imagines a unicorn, any unicorn
- Intuitively, there are different success conditions depending on the reading (specific or non-
specific) of the indefinite in “Jones seeks a sweater or a balloon”. Roughly, this sentence can imply
either:
1Thanks to E. Zimmermann for correcting an unfortunate confusion between validity and satisfaction which there was
at that point in the original version of these comments, due to a confusion between the reading of the sentence and the
scenario relative to which it is evaluated.
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(15) (specific): ∃x((S(x) ∨B(x)) ∧¤search-worlds of j(FIND(j, x) → SUCC(x, j)))
(non-specific): ∀x((S(x) ∨B(x)) → ¤search-worlds of j(FIND(j, x) → SUCC(x, j)))
- Maybe the contrast be traced to the link between indefinites and the universal sense of “any”:
(16) Jones seeks a sweater, any one would do.
*Jones seeks a particular sweater, any one would do
• Specific vs non-specific readings
What is the difference between a specific and a non-specific reading in Zimmermann’s theory?
The specific/non-specific distinction is usually phrased as a distinction between de re/de dicto,
referential/non-referential, and also wide scope/narrow scope reading (see Montague 1973 on seek,
where all three distinctions coincide). Here, the distinction is not stricto sensu a matter of scope, since
both specific and non-specific readings rest on wide scope quantification. Rather, it rests on the type
of object that is quantified over: individual (specific) vs property (non-specific). This type distinction
is moreover related to the question of existence/non-existence (issue of referentiality). Zimmermann
takes non-specific readings to block inferences to existence (since a property can fail to be instantiated
by individuals).
- However, the existential impact of a reading seems partly orthogonal to the specific/non-specific
distinction, which is also found with predicates that are never instantiated, and it seems to depend
rather on the lexical semantics of the TV. Intuitively, (a) and (c) are both about a specific object,
though a non-existent one in (a) and an existing one in (c):
(17) (a) Jones is looking for a unicorn, not any unicorn, but the one with green eyes that
reappears every night in his dreams.
(b) Jones is looking for a unicorn, any unicorn
(c) Jones has seen/met a unicorn in the forest
- This relates to an example that is discussed on p. 28 of the manuscript:
“Suppose Jones goes to a bar and meets a lady who he feels attracted to and therefore would
like to see again. Due to some misunderstanding, he erroneously believes her to be the boss
of the company he wants to make business with ; as a matter of fact it is worker-owned. On
the following day, when paying a visit to the company, his first objective is to find the boss.”
(Zimmermann 2005, 28)
(18) (a) Jones is looking for a boss
(b) *Jones is looking for a boss, any boss
Situation where “a boss” is intuitively de dicto, but nevertheless where the seeking is about a
specific, existent object, and where supplementary any is blocked. In Zimmermann’s analysis, this is
captured by the non-specific reading:
(19) ∃P [P ⊑ λxBoss(x) ∧ SEEK(j, P )]
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The object of Jones’ search is a subproperty of the property of being a boss, whose specification
is left to the pragmatics of the discourse situation. For Zimmermann, this means that the reading of
“a boss” nevertheless counts as semantically non-specific, although it is specific in a pragmatic sense.
However, what will the account of supplementary any be in general, which seems to be correlated to
non-specific readings in the intuitive sense, and to be excluded for ETVs? Can it be purely pragmatic?
- Zimmermann’s scenario is as it were symmetric to those which support Janet Fodor’s “non-
specific de re” reading (a.k.a “third reading”, in “John seeks a hat just like mine”, where the property
of “being a hat just like mine” is taken de re by the ascriber, and not represented as such by the
ascribee):2 here we seem to have rather a “specific de dicto” reading of the NP, for Jones is looking
for a specific person, but who fulfills the property of being a boss only in his belief worlds. However,
it is not obvious what the logical form corresponding precisely to this reading should be. Maybe (by
analogy to Bonomi’s 1995 representation of the non-specific de re reading in second-order logic),
assuming a standard lexical decomposition of seek as try to find:
∃x(TRY (j, Boss(x) ∧ FIND(j, x))) (specific, de dicto)
∃x(Boss(x) ∧ TRY (j, FIND(j, x))) (specific, de re)
TRY (j, ∃x(Boss(x) ∧ FIND(j, x))) (non-specific, de dicto)
∃P (P = λxBoss(x) ∧ (TRY (j,∃x(P (x) ∧ FIND(j, x))))) (non specific, de re)
Here too, specificity is attached to an existential quantifier over individuals taking wide scope over
TRY , but non-specificity to the quantifier taking narrow scope. The de re/de dicto distinction attaches
to whether the property (descriptive condition) takes wide scope over TRY . Existence/non-existence,
finally, may depend on whether one is allowed to quantify over possibly non-existent objects.
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